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Abstract
Forgery operations on video contents are nowadays within the reach of anyone, thanks to the availability of powerful and user-friendly
editing software. Integrity verification and authentication of videos represent a major interest in both journalism (e.g., fake news
debunking) and legal environments dealing with digital evidence (e.g., a court of law). While several strategies and different forensics
traces have been proposed in recent years, latest solutions aim at increasing the accuracy by combining multiple detectors and
features. This paper presents a video forgery localization framework that verifies the self-consistency of coding traces between and
within video frames, by fusing the information derived from a set of independent feature descriptors. The feature extraction step
is carried out by means of an explainable convolutional neural network architecture, specifically designed to look for and classify
coding artifacts. The overall framework was validated in two typical forgery scenarios: temporal and spatial splicing. Experimental
results show an improvement to the state-of-the-art on temporal splicing localization and also promising performance in the newly
tackled case of spatial splicing, on both synthetic and real-world videos.
Keywords: Forgery Detection, Video Splicing, Content Integrity, Feature Fusion, Multimedia Forensics
1. Introduction
Authenticity assessment for video sequences is nowadays a
paramount task in several contexts, such as citizen journalism
and fake news debunking, as well as evidence validation in
legal procedures and fraud detection. This concern has gained
importance during the last years because of the wide availability
of powerful and easily-operable video editing programs (e.g.,
Adobe Premiere, Apple Final Cut, etc.) and the wide-spread
use of video data in communication and documenting activities.
Moreover, the development of deep learning solutions for the
automatic creation and editing of image and video contents have
posed new challenges to forensic analysts, since a malicious user
has the opportunity to create fake contents that overcome most
of the existing detectors.
As a matter of fact, forensic analysts have been constantly
investigating innovative and accurate solutions for forgery detec-
tion and localization. Among the first strategies being proposed,
we can find detectors that identify the acquisition device [1, 2],
physical inconsistencies [3], video recapturing [4], frame dele-
tion and insertion [5, 6], or codec-related operations [7, 8, 9].
Most of these detectors verify the self-consistency [10, 11] of
video processing footprints, i.e., the uniformity of traces left
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on the signal across different frames and regions of the video
sequence. Whenever an external element is included within an
original image or video, the forensic footprints in the altered
region change with respect to untouched ones. Revealing such a
discrepancy allows detecting the possible presence of a forgery.
Extending the preliminary work in [12], the current paper
proposes a FOrgery loCALizer (FOCAL) that checks the self-
consistency of multiple and independent forensic traces related
to video coding (Figure 1). Differently from the previous work,
where forgeries only consisted in concatenating video sequences
from different sources (temporal splicing), this new approach is
also able to precisely localize an altered region within a single
frame (spatial splicing) as well as along time dimension.
Given an input video, each frame is split into smaller patches,
and a feature vector is extracted from each one of them. The set
of features corresponds to the output values of the final softmax
layers from multiple convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
dedicated to the classification of different coding parameters,
such as coding standard and quality level. These CNNs share
an explainable architecture, which was specifically designed to
look for coding artifacts by aligning the receptive fields of the
network filters to the quantization block boundaries, where the
most significant traces are typically visible.
An unsupervised fusion technique was designed to merge the
outputs of these heterogeneous feature descriptors into a human-
readable heatmap, which characterizes each frame-patch from
the analyzed video with a likelihood measure that models the
probability of being forged. This approach also makes the frame-
work scalable and extendible at will, allowing the introduction
of additional detectors and feature descriptors to contribute to
the overall heatmap.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier September 7, 2020
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Figure 1: FOrgery loCALizer (FOCAL) framework. A forged video-frame is split into 64×64 patches and fed to a set of pre-trained detectors (e.g. classifiers of the
video coding standard and quality). Extracted features are rearranged into feature-maps and a fusion function merges them into a single detection heat-map. Dashed
and solid lines are used to denote patch-wise and frame-wise operations, respectively.
Experimental validation takes into account different forgery
setups, such as temporal and spatial splicing, in controlled and
uncontrolled environments. Results show that the proposed
solution is able to improve the performance of [12], thanks to the
newly adopted network architecture, and to obtain convincing
results in the detection of local forgeries as well, with an area
under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve of 0.94.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
overviews the literature on video forgery detection and local-
ization, distinguishing between temporal and spatial forgeries.
Section 3 formally defines the problem addressed by the paper
and the notation used. Section 4 presents the proposed CNN
for extracting coding-related features, with special emphasis
on the architectural choices. Section 5 illustrates our forgery
localization framework, from the feature extraction step to the
final feature fusion and heatmap generation, in both temporal
and spatial forgery cases. Section 6 reports all the details about
the experimental setup, the training phase, the generation of the
synthetic dataset and the obtained results. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper and outlines possible future work.
2. Related work
In recent years, video authentication has emerged as a novel
and challenging research field [13, 14] leading to the develop-
ment of algorithms and tools capable of estimating whether a
video sequence is original or not. Most of the proposed ap-
proaches identifies two different types of forgeries: temporal
and spatial splicing. The first case affects a video through the
inclusion or deletion of some frames into or from the original
sequence. In the second one, the content of individual frames
is modified, e.g., with a cut-and-paste alteration of a region (in-
clusion/removal of an object from the scene) or performing an
upscale-crop editing (where an object located in an outermost
part of the video is removed by cropping the frames). Fur-
thermore, it is worth mentioning double/multiple compression.
Since video sequences are usually available in compressed for-
mat and their alterations are carried out in the pixel domain,
videos must be re-encoded every time a forgery is operated. For
this reason, forged sequences typically exhibit the presence of
multiple compression artifacts.
Among the strategies for detecting the insertion/deletion of
frames, some algorithms exploit the correlation and similarity
between frame characteristics [15, 16]: if some temporal pat-
terns do not follow the expected trend, the algorithm raises an
alarm. Similarly, other solutions identify regular patterns in the
camera noise signals: whenever there are repetitions [17] or
oddities [18, 19] due to the fact that forged frames were taken by
a different camera, the algorithm reports an anomaly. Deletions
can be highlighted by spotting irregularities in motion statistics,
obtainable through the analysis of the optical flow [20, 21], inter-
polation [22], or standard block matching [23]. The correlation
in prediction residual information [24, 25], in texture patterns
[26] and in brightness [27] can be exploited as well.
Spatial forgeries can be detected by checking the consistency
of forensic traces left by the acquisition device or different en-
coding algorithms on the video sequence. The strategy proposed
in [28] exploits the scaling invariance of the minimum average
correlation energy Mellin radial harmonic (MACE-MRH) corre-
lation filter to unveil traces of upscale-crop forgeries. Similarly,
the impact of a spatial splicing on interlaced videos can be an-
alyzed to reveal the traces of a possible alteration [29]. Object
removal is exposed by detecting discrepancies in the motion
vectors [30] and through a combination of different steganaly-
sis features [31]. Copy-move object removal can be revealed
by exploiting local descriptors, such as histogram of oriented
gradients (HoG) [32] or scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT)
descriptors [33]. The same type of forgery can also be detected
by analyzing the spatial and temporal correlation among frames
[34], Zernike moments [35], and optical flow similarities [36].
Together with intra-frame similarities and discrepancies, it is
possible to expose physical inconsistencies in scene illumination
and object motion, by comparing a plausible model with what is
estimated directly from the pixels [3].
Revealing traces of multiple compression on the analyzed
video sequence allows an effective detection of editing opera-
tions. A first insight was provided in [37], followed by several
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researches extending to videos the coding footprints identified
for images [9, 38]. The misalignment of the group-of-pictures
(GOP) structures related to the first and the second encoding can
be informative as well: whenever the coding parameters change
between two consecutive encoding steps, a superposition of het-
erogeneous artifacts appears on the video and can be detected
[39]. Similarly, the simultaneous presence of traces related to
incompatible coding parameters or formats is investigated in sev-
eral papers [8, 40, 41]. Furthermore, whenever a video sequence
is compressed twice, it is possible to observe some peculiar
noise patterns: in [42] the authors propose a first-order Markov
statistics for the differences between quantized discrete cosine
transform (DCT) coefficients along different directions, while
the solution in [43] employs a modified Huber Markov random
field (HMRF) model. These methods enables to assess whether
a whole sequence of frames is authentic or tampered (e.g. com-
pressed twice) but, differently from the proposed one, do not
allow for precisely localizing a forgery operation.
Recent approaches are setting up a new trend in video forgery
detection by using deep neural networks. In [44] the authors
propose an autoencoder structure to learn a synthetic model of
the source (forgeries are detected as outlier of the learned model)
followed by recurrent neural networks (RNNs), implemented
with the long short-term memory (LSTM) model, to exploit
temporal dependencies. In [12] two CNNs are independently
trained to extract codec- and quality-related features with the
purpose of detecting temporal inconsistencies, showing that the
combination of heterogeneous detectors enhances the overall
performance. Some studies have also been addressed to expose
the newly appeared threat of AI-generated highly-realistic forg-
eries, also known as DeepFakes. The detection is carried out by
means of eye-blinking analysis [45] and combinations of deep
learning models such as CNNs and RNNs [46].
Following the trend of fusing multiple features to increase the
overall accuracy, the proposed strategy combines a set of coding-
related features obtained from different CNNs. The architecture
of these networks was designed in awareness of where and how
compression artifacts appear, as described in Section 4.
3. Problem definition
The purpose of FOCAL framework is detecting and localizing
temporal and spatial splicing operations on video sequences.
Here we provide a formal definition of the tackled problem and
the notation used throughout the paper.
Let us define a video sequence X as an array of N frames
denoted by Xn,
X = [X1,X2, . . . ,XN] , (1)
where each frame is a matrix of pixels Xuv,
Xn = [Xuv]n . (2)
Pixel coordinates are (u, v) ∈ U × V, where U = |U| and
V = |V| are the frame dimensions.
Definition 1. Let X and Y be two sequences of frames of di-
mensions UX , VX , NX and UY , VY , NY , respectively. The two
sequences are spliceable if UX = UY and VX = VY .
(a) High quality. (b) Low quality.
Figure 2: Block-artifacts at different encoding qualities in a 64 × 64 patch. The
grid of 8 × 8 blocks is particularly evident in 2(b).
Without loss of generality, we will define the two types of
forgeries addressed by this work for spliceable sequences only.
Definition 2. Let X and Y be two spliceable sequences. A
temporal splicing is a function T that concatenates X and Y
into a single sequence:
T (X,Y) = [X1, . . . ,XNX ,Y1, . . . ,YNY ] . (3)
The resulting sequence is called temporally-spliced and the
frame-index NX + 1 is the splicing point.
Definition 3. Let [Xuv] and [Yuv] be two frames from two splice-
able sequences X and Y, with pixels inU ×V. Let R ⊂ U ×V
be a subset of pixel coordinates. A spatial splicing is a function
S that substitutes pixels in R of one frame with pixels in R of
the other frame:
S (Xuv,Yuv,R) =
Yuv, (u, v) ∈ RXuv, otherwise . (4)
The resulting sequence is called spatially-spliced and the altered
region R is called spliced region.
Given a video sequence under analysis, with no additional
information available except for the pixel values, we aim to
localize possible splicing points or spliced regions.
4. Coding features
The core of our forgery localizer consists of a convolutional
neural network specifically designed to detect and classify traces
left by video-coding algorithms. Understanding which coding
scheme and parameters were used to encode a video clip, by
only looking at the pixel domain, represents a challenging task
even for a human observer. However, almost anyone is able
to perform a rough classification on the perceptive quality of
a video, usually by looking for the presence of block-artifacts,
typically more evident in lower quality videos (see Figure 2).
Block-artifacts are introduced by any coding algorithm adopt-
ing the block-based transform principle. This coding paradigm
first splits the set of frames into groups-of-pictures (GOPs) that
are encoded independently of one another. Each frame within a
GOP is encoded according to a pattern of predefined types.
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Table 1: Network architecture
Layer Kernels w s z Activation
Conv-1 64 4 × 4 1 0 BN + ReLU
Conv-2 64 3 × 3 2 0 BN + ReLU
Conv-3 64 4 × 4 1 0 BN + ReLU
Conv-4 64 3 × 3 2 0 BN + ReLU
Conv-5 64 3 × 3 2 1 BN + ReLU
FC-1 64
FC-2 K Softmax
w = kernel size; s = stride; z = padding.
• Intra or I type: the frame is coded independently from all
the others; the first frame of each GOP must be intra-coded.
• Predictive or P type: the frame is encoded with motion
compensation, using the previous I or P frames as refer-
ences.
• Bidirectionally predictive or B type: the frame is encoded
with motion compensation, using the previous and the fol-
lowing I or P frames as references.
The actual encoding procedure involves a domain transform
(for example the DCT) applied to block of pixels, typically
8 × 8. The obtained coefficients are then quantized and fed
into an entropy encoder. The lower the bitrate, the coarser is
the coefficients representation, resulting in blurry blocks and
evident discontinuities at the block boundaries.
Since block-artifacts appear to be quite distinctive for the
human vision, we attempted to design a network whose atten-
tion is focalized on these particular features. Specifically, we
wanted our network to analyze the regions nearby the corners
of the block-grid, as each one of them allows to observe four
blocks and boundaries at the same time. To accomplish that, the
network architecture was designed to align with the block-grid
and to extract a descriptor for each corner and its associated
neighborhood. To better understand this, we need to introduce
the concept of receptive field. The receptive field denotes the
region of the input that a particular network neuron is looking at.
It is described by its center position and its size. Pixels contribu-
tion to the calculation of the output feature grows exponentially
towards the center of the receptive field. Given the input size,
the layers of a CNN can be designed in order to produce features
with the desired receptive field.
The CNN architecture we propose consists of: five convolu-
tional layers, each one followed by a batch normalization (BN)
and a rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation; two fully-connected
layers; a softmax activation layer. Table 1 reports the complete
list of layers, specifying for each convolutional one the number
of kernels, the kernel size w, the stride s and the padding size z.
The input to the CNN is a luminance patch of 64 × 64 pixels.
Chrominances are neglected since they do not add relevant infor-
mation to block-artifacts and are often subsampled. Assuming a
block-grid of 8×8 transform blocks, each patch contains exactly
7 × 7 = 49 corners.
Figure 3 provides a visualization of the five convolutional
layers and a computation of four geometrical parameters per
each layer:
• the number of output features m, based on the number of
input features and the layer properties,
mout =
⌊
min + 2z − w
s
⌋
+ 1; (5)
• the jump factor j in the output feature map, given by the
jump in the input times the stride size,
jout = jin · s; (6)
• the receptive field size r of the output feature map,
rout = rin + (w − 1) · jin; (7)
• the center position c of the receptive field of the first output
feature,
cout = cin +
(
w − 1
2
− z
)
· jin. (8)
All parameters are computed with respect to those of the previous
layer. In the input layer, we have m0 = 64 features (the input
size), jump factor and receptive field both equal to one pixel
( j0 = r0 = 1) and the center position is the center of the first
pixel (c0 = 0.5). Green areas in Figure 3 represent those parts of
the feature map carrying information related to block boundaries.
Yellow areas are associated with pixels within the blocks.
With this particular design, the network progressively con-
denses the block-grid, without blending together the descriptors
associated to different corner points. The output of the last
convolutional layer is a 7-by-7-by-64 tensor, forming a map of
64-elements descriptors, one for each corner of the input patch.
This tensor is fed into a fully connected network that returns the
final K-length patch descriptor, where K depends on the chosen
number of classification outputs.
The feature descriptors calculated by this CNN can be ex-
ploited in a variety of forensic applications. In the following
section, we discuss the design of our forgery localization frame-
work, which checks the self-consistency of these coding features
to detect temporal and spatial splicing operations.
5. Forgery localization
This first implementation of FOCAL employs the CNN de-
scribed in 4 to extract from an input frame-patch a descriptor
associated to its coding standard and quality. The idea is that
patches or frames coming from different video sequences will
exhibit different coding traces. Detecting descriptor inconsisten-
cies may therefore lead to localizing forgeries.
The proposed CNN was trained to solved a 4-class codec
classification task, within the following closed set of coding
standards,
{MPEG-2, MPEG-4, H.264, H.265},
4
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Figure 3: Architecture of the convolutional layers, with feature map size (mi), jump factor ( ji), receptive field size (ri) and center position (ci). Green areas denote
feature activations related to block boundaries. The output of Conv-5 is a 7-by-7-by-64 tensor, consisting of one 64-length feature vector for each corner of the block
grid.
and a 4-class quality classification task, where the encoding
quality is determined by the following values of the quantization
step,
∆ = {5, 10, 20, 40}.
We will refer to the four quality levels throughout the paper as
high, medium-high, medium-low and low, respectively.
The two trained models were kept separate and used as in-
dependent feature extractors (details on the training phase are
provided in Sections 6.1,6.2. Note also that this framework is
scalable to an arbitrary number of trained models, given that
they output a vector-shaped feature descriptor.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the feature extraction
phase and the algorithms designed to detect inconsistencies in
the descriptors, with the purpose of solving two typical video
forensics scenarios: temporal and spatial splicing localization.
5.1. Feature extraction
Let X be a video sequence of N frames, as defined in Section
3. Each frame Xn is split into 64 × 64 patches Xpn , p ∈ [1, P],
where the number of patches P depends on the video resolution
and on the stride used for patch extraction. Note that, in the
case of overlapping patches, the stride must be a multiple of the
dimension of the coding blocks (8 pixels), in order to maintain
the alignment described in Section 4. The extracted patches are
then converted to YCbCr color space and their luma components
are fed into the two trained CNNs.
For each patch Xpn , the output of each network is a four-
element feature vector,
f pC(n) = [ f
p
H264(n), f
p
H265(n), f
p
MPEG2(n), f
p
MPEG4(n)],
f pQ(n) = [ f
p
low(n), f
p
m-low(n), f
p
m-high(n), f
p
high(n)],
where each element f p{·}(n) represents the likelihood of the p-th
patch from the n-th frame being encoded with one of the four
considered codecs/qualities. Due to the final softmax activa-
tion, feature vectors are non-negative and sum to one. As well
as considering these vectors as probability distributions over
codec/quality classes, one can interpret them as general descrip-
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(a) Medium-low-quality MPEG-2 spliced with low-quality MPEG-4. (b) High-quality H.264 spliced with medium-high-quality MPEG-2.
Figure 4: Two examples of temporal splicing localization. Feature descriptors (below) are analyzed by means of the Euclidean distance (above) between adjacent
vectors. Figure 4(b) also shows the presence of false positives due to intra-coded frames, with periodicity given by the GOP size.
tors capturing local coding traces. As a matter of fact, for forgery
detection we are not required to exactly detect the adopted codec
and the related coding parameters, but rather observe some sort
of feature inconsistency between and within frames.
Given our patch-level descriptors, obtained from heteroge-
neous feature extractors, we can design different algorithms that
leverage such information to detect anomalies, which in turn
raise an alarm on the possible presence of forgeries.
5.2. Temporal splicing localization
The proposed temporal splicing localization algorithm re-
lies on the presented features to calculate a descriptor for each
frame of the video, and then look for inconsistencies between
adjacent descriptors. Without loss of generality, we considered
temporally-spliced videos composed by only two shots, since
this can be easily extended by iterating the same procedure. Ad-
ditionally, we considered the case of spliced videos obtained
with sequences encoded with different codecs and/or different
quality parameters, thus simulating the case of compilations
of shots coming from different devices, broadcasting sources
and social media, as well as shots compressed multiple times or
re-encoded as a whole after being spliced.
Given the patch-level features obtained with the procedure
in 5.1, the desired frame-level feature vectors, fC(n), fQ(n), are
obtained through a standard average,
fC(n) =
1
P
P∑
p=1
f pC(n), (9)
fQ(n) =
1
P
P∑
p=1
f pQ(n), (10)
where all operations are performed element-wise.
Finally, the two vectors are concatenated into a general eight-
element frame descriptor,
f(n) = [fC(n), fQ(n)]. (11)
To automatically detect inconsistencies over time, we compute
the squared Euclidean distance between adjacent feature vectors,
∆f(n) = ‖f(n) − f(n + 1)‖2, (12)
and we feed ∆f(n) to a threshold-detector.
Figure 4 reports two examples of temporal splicing localiza-
tion, applied to 200-frame videos with a splicing point at frame
n = 100. Figure 4(a) shows a 100-frame MPEG-2 medium-low-
quality video, spliced with a 100-frame MPEG-4 low-quality
video. We can observe an evident feature inconsistency at the
splicing point, which is correctly detected in the Euclidean dis-
tance domain. Note that the ∆f axis is displayed in logarithmic
scale and the splicing peak is actually two orders of magnitude
higher than the background. Figure 4(b) highlights the sensitiv-
ity of the algorithm to intra-coded frames. In the second half
of the compilation, the system detects a strong inconsistency
once every 30 frames (the GOP size), producing a series of false
positives (even though the actual splicing point still yields a
significantly higher peak). However, the pattern is regular by its
very nature, and thus easy to neglect automatically. Interestingly,
note how such inconsistencies are detected only by quality fea-
tures (lower four), while codec ones remain, correctly, idle: the
codec itself is not changing in presence of an I frame, but coding
parameters are.
5.3. Spatial splicing localization
Differently from temporal forgeries, the problem of identify-
ing and localizing a spatial splicing has to be solved within a sin-
gle frame. The proposed spatial splicing localization algorithm
relies on the presented features to calculate local descriptors
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(a) Feature tensor F (classifier output). (b) Activation tensor H.
(c) Variance-to-entropy ratios (VERs). (d) Activation map fusion H¯.
Figure 5: Example of spatial splicing localization. The output maps of the CNN classifiers in 5(a) are processed by the activation function in (15), obtaining the
activation maps in 5(b). The latter are then averaged using the VERs defined in (16) as weights, providing the final activation map in 5(d).
within the frame, and then look for possible coding inconsis-
tencies. The presence of altered regions comes in the form of
activation maps, containing the likelihood of being altered for
each patch in the frame. Note how this scenario is significantly
more challenging than temporal forgeries: having not the oppor-
tunity of averaging feature vectors, as in the case of frame-level
descriptors, translates into reasonably less accurate features, and
thus requires a more sophisticated processing.
Given a frame Xn, patch-level descriptors f pC(n) and f
p
Q(n) are
extracted as described in 5.1. We recommend an 8-pixel stride to
have a dense description of the frame, while remaining aligned
with the quantization grid. The two vectors are concatenated
into a general eight-element patch descriptor,
f p = [f pC(n), f
p
Q(n)]. (13)
Let PU , PV be the number of patches extracted along the U,V di-
mensions of frame Xn, respectively. The patch-level descriptors
are then arranged in a PU × PV × 8 frame-level feature tensor,
F(n) =

f1,1(n) . . . f1,PV (n)
...
. . .
...
fPU ,1(n) . . . fPU ,PV (n)
 . (14)
We call a feature map, Fk(n), k ∈ [1, 8], each PU ×PV ×1 matrix
in the tensor.
Figure 5(a) shows an example of feature tensor, with the eight
feature maps plotted separately. In this example, the splicing is
located at the bottom-left corner of the frame.
The second step consists in transforming the feature tensor
into an activation tensor, i.e., a set of eight activation maps.
Each map Fk(n) of the feature tensor is fed separately into a
suitable activation function h(·) to produce an activation map
Hk(n). With the purpose of highlighting regions that differs from
the general trend, we chose as activation function the pixel-wise
squared distance from the average value,
Hk(n) = h(Fk(n)) = ‖Fk(n) − E (Fk(n))‖2, (15)
where E(·) denotes the expectation operator.
Figure 5(b) shows the activation tensor obtained from the fea-
ture tensor in Figure 5(a). Note the importance of the activation
function for the feature map k = 4, in particular.
The last and most delicate step consists in fusing the activa-
tion tensor into the final activation map. The main issue is that
not all feature maps are equally informative, in general: since
each map activates in presence of a specific coding trace, it fol-
lows that maps carrying the highest information content will be
those related to the coding parameters closest to what is actually
present in the analyzed frame. In Figure 5(b), for instance, we
observe that: (i) maps number 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8 correctly agree
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on an activation at the bottom-left corner; (ii) map number 3
does not activate at all; (iii) maps number 6 and 7 show a noisy
and wide activation, probably due to a background-foreground
coding difference in the original video.
To automatically select the most informative maps, we devised
a twofold criterion accounting for the possible presence of idle
and/or widely-activated maps.
1. High variance: a useful map should contain diversity in
its values, if an activation is present. This condition helps
filtering out idle maps.
2. Low entropy: a useful activation should be localized to the
tampered region. This condition helps filtering out noisy or
widely-activated maps.
With these two conditions in mind, we defined a metric called
variance-to-entropy ratio (VER),
VER(x) =
var(x)
H(x)
, x r.v. (16)
which merges the high-variance and low-entropy conditions into
a single scoring value.
Figure 5(c) reports the VERs obtained for the activation maps
in the current example. Note that the highest VER values are
related to the maps resulting the most informative according to
the criteria outlined above, i.e., k = 2, 4, 5, 8.
The final fused activation map H¯(n) for frame Xn is obtained
as
H¯(n) =
K∑
k=1
(VER (Hk(n)) ·Hk(n))
K∑
k=1
VER (Hk(n))
, (17)
which denotes an element-wise weighted average of the eight
activation maps, with weights equal to the VERs.
Figure 5(d) shows the fusion result for the activation maps of
the current example. As required, all noisy and flat activation
maps are discarded, while meaningful ones are retained and
merged together into a human-readable output.
6. Experiments and results
A distinctive trait of FOCAL framework consists in train-
ing the same CNN described in Section 4 to solve different
classification tasks. In this work, we trained two independent
coding-related models:
• a 4-class codec classifier;
• a 4-class quality classifier.
This section describes the training of the proposed CNN and
the testing campaign carried out to evaluate the system in re-
alistic scenarios, along with the obtained experimental results.
Subsections 6.1 and 6.2 report the training details for the two
employed models; 6.3 describes the generation of the testing
dataset; 6.4 and 6.5 outline the performed experiments in con-
trolled and uncontrolled scenarios.
6.1. Codec-CNN training
The model was trained on four video codecs: H.264, H.265,
MPEG-2 and MPEG-4.
A training dataset of 300 high-resolution videos was built,
starting from five uncompressed video sequences: duckstakeoff
(720p), stockholm (720p), ice (4CIF), harbour (4CIF), parkrun
(720p). Each video was encoded with the FFmpeg library to
obtain 60 different versions, combining the four codecs with dif-
ferent coding configurations: fixed quality parameter q ranging
from 1 to 10; constant bitrate set to 2 Mb/s, 4 Mb/s and 6 Mb/s;
variable bitrate set to 2 Mb/s, 4 Mb/s and 6 Mb/s; GOP of 30
frames.
To validate the codec classification network, we built a similar
dataset of 300 high-resolution videos following the same proce-
dure adopted for the training phase, but starting from a different
set of original video sequences: parkjoy (720p), parkrun (720p),
shields (720p), soccer (4CIF), and stockholm (720p).
To test the the codec classification network on a completely un-
related set, we built a dataset of 1672 low-resolution videos, start-
ing from 19 sequences at CIF resolution: akiyo, crew, mother,
soccer, bridgeclose, flower, news, table, city, foreman, paris,
tempete, coastguard, hall, salesman, waterfall, container, mo-
bile, signirene. Each video was encoded with FFmpeg mixing
codecs and qualities: fixed quality parameter q ranging from 1
to 31 with step 2; constant bitrate set to 500 Kb/s, 1 Mb/s and 2
Mb/s; variable bitrate set to 500 Kb/s, 1 Mb/s and 2 Mb/s; GOP
of 10 frames.
The network was trained with the following parameters:
Adam optimizer with standard parameters and learning rate,
categorical cross-entropy loss function. We selected the model
minimizing the validation loss over 50 epochs.
6.2. Quality-CNN training
The model was trained on four quality levels identified by the
quantization step ∆. Such value is not directly accessible in the
majority of codecs, as it is usually controlled by a higher-level
quality parameter q, the implementation of which may differ
from codec to codec. As a matter of fact, the relation between
∆ and q is exponential in H.264 (18), and piece-wise linear in
MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 (19):
∆H264 =
5
8
· 2q/6, (18)
∆MPEG =

8, 1 ≤ q ≤ 4
2q, 5 ≤ q ≤ 8
q + 8, 9 ≤ q ≤ 24
2q − 16, 25 ≤ q ≤ 31
. (19)
To generate the training, validation and testing sets, we con-
sidered three different codecs, namely MPEG-2, MPEG-4 and
H.264, and tuned the respective quality parameters according to
(18) and (19) in order to have the same quantization step.
Seven raw videos in YUV format and 4CIF quality were
used: crew, crowdrun, duckstakeoff, harbour, ice, parkjoy,
soccer. Each video was encoded with FFmpeg, using three
codecs (MPEG-2, MPEG-4, H.264), four quantization steps
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(∆ = {5, 10, 20, 40}), variable bitrate (VBR) and GOP 30, yield-
ing a total of 84 video sequences. From each video, we extracted
30 frames and 99 non-overlapping 64 × 64 patches per frame,
yielding a total of 249480 patches. However, we observed a
clear performance improvement, both in training and testing,
using only high-variance patches, since “flat” ones tend to look
alike in every codec-quality configuration. We set a variance
threshold of 103, ending up retaining 122473 patches (about
50% of the total). The set of patches was partitioned as follows:
70% for training, 20% for validation and 10% for testing.
The network was trained with the following parameters:
stochastic gradient descent with momentum (SGDM) optimizer,
categorical cross-entropy loss function, initial learning rate
5 · 10−3 with drop factor 0.5 every 5 epochs, batch size 256.
We selected the model minimizing the validation loss over 50
epochs.
6.3. Testing dataset
The generation process of the final testing dataset was split
into two steps. First, we created a set D of encoded videos,
using different codecs and qualities. Then, we used the videos in
D to produce two datasets: one setDtemp of temporally-spliced
videos and one setDspat of spatially-spliced videos.
Dataset D was generated starting from five uncompressed
videos that were not included in the previous sets used for train-
ing, validation and testing: four people, in to tree, johnny, kris-
ten and sara, old town cross. Each video is 210 frames long
and 720p resolution. Using FFmpeg, each sequence was en-
coded with MPEG-2, MPEG-4 and H.264 codecs, with GOP
set to 30 frames and four fixed values of the quality parame-
ter, q = {3, 8, 13, 18}, for a total of 12 different versions of the
same video. Overall, the dataset consisted of 60 encoded videos,
or 12600 frames. The choice of using q for the final system
evaluation is motivated by two reasons: first, it allows to test
the algorithm in a scenario closer to a real-world case, since in
everyday applications the encoding quality is tuned by means of
the quality parameter, not the quantization step directly; then, it
produces a testing set that is even more uncorrelated with that
used in the CNN training and testing phases.
Denoting with vi, i ∈ [1, 5] a video from the five originals,
datasetD consists of
D = {Dv1 , . . . ,Dv5 },
where Dvi ⊂ D, |Dvi | = 12, is the subset containing all the
different versions of vi.
DatasetDtemp for temporal splicing localization was obtained
by splicing the first 100 frames of each video in Dvi with the
second 100 frames of any other video inDvi , for each i. Given
that the number of possible pairs in a set of 12 elements is(
12
2
)
= 66, dataset Dtemp consists of 5 × 66 = 330 temporally-
spliced videos, corresponding to 330 × 200 = 66000 frames.
Dataset Dspat for spatial splicing localization was obtained
by substituting a CIF window (288 × 352) of each video inDvi
with the same window of any other video inDvi , for each i. The
window was placed at the center of the frame, with the top-left
corner aligned with the patch extraction grid, and kept fixed
Figure 6: ROC curves for frame-wise temporal splicing localization. Comparison
of codec-related, quality-related and combined features, for the proposed method
and the baseline [12].
Figure 7: PR curves for frame-wise temporal splicing localization. Comparison
of codec-related, quality-related and combined features.
throughout the length of the video. Similarly toDtemp, dataset
Dspat consists of 330 spatially-spliced videos, corresponding to
66000 frames, or 1452000 patches.
To simulate a more realistic scenario, videos in Dtemp and
Dspat were re-encoded with high-quality H.264 after the forgery.
Note that, since we are using different versions of the same
video, there are no scene changes or content inconsistencies
in the forged sequences: temporally-spliced videos have the
first 100 frames encoded differently from the subsequent ones;
spatially-spliced videos have a CIF window in the middle of
the frame encoded differently from the rest. This is necessary
to assess the capability of our algorithm to properly localize
changes in coding rather than content.
6.4. Experiments in controlled environment
For each forensic scenario, namely temporal and spatial splic-
ing, we run three separate tests: one using codec-related features
alone; one using quality-related features alone; one using the
concatenated features.
Dataset Dtemp was analyzed with the algorithm outlined in
Section 5.2. The detection of splicing points was evaluated
frame-wise: a true-positive consisted of a splicing point correctly
identified in the transition between two adjacent frames. For this
experiment, false positives related to the GOPs were discarded,
as discussed in Section 5.2.
Figure 6 reports the ROC curves obtained for temporal splic-
ing localization with the three different features. For each case,
a direct comparison with the baseline work in [12] is provided.
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Table 2: Forgery localization at different re-encoding qualities
Original frame Forged frame Lossless q = 10 q = 20 q = 30
Decaying localization performance at lower re-encoding qualities of the same forged video. From top to bottom, frames 52, 78
and 144 of sequence 01 of the REWIND dataset [24]. From left to right, the original frame, the forged frame, the localization
heatmaps for lossless and lossy H.264 encoding, with quality parameter q = 10, 20, 30.
Figure 8: ROC curves for patch-wise spatial splicing localization, using de-
scriptors from a single frame. Comparison of codec-related, quality-related and
combined features.
Figure 9: ROC curves for patch-wise spatial splicing localization, using descrip-
tors averaged over multiple frames. Comparison of codec-related, quality-related
and combined features.
All three descriptors outperform the baseline ones, with an AUC
peaking at 0.984 for the concatenated descriptor. For better ap-
preciating the small differences between concatenated features
and separate ones in the proposed method (that appear squished
in the top-left corner), we report the same results displayed as
PR curves in Figure 7. We can observe how quality-related
features fQ provide better results than codec-related ones fC in
this scenario. However, the concatenated features f still lead
to an improvement with respect to fQ alone. Tests run on the
concatenated descriptor f show a 100% precision up to a recall
of roughly 80%, denoting a good robustness of the algorithm
to false positives, and an AUC of 0.926. The optimal operating
point of the green curve corresponds to an F1-measure of 0.902.
DatasetDspat was analyzed with the algorithm outlined in Sec-
tion 5.3. The detection was evaluated patch-wise: a true-positive
consisted of a 64 × 64 patch correctly classified as forged. We
run two separate tests: one with patch-level descriptors obtained
frame-by-frame; one with descriptors obtained by averaging
throughout the video frames.
Figure 8 reports the ROC curves obtained for spatial splicing
localization on a single frame, with the three different features.
Again, the benefits of using concatenated descriptors are clearly
visible. Note also how in this case fC performs better than fQ,
when taken individually. We can assume this is due to the fact
that quality is trickier to assess at patch-level than at frame-level:
low-variance patches, for instance, typically look very similar at
different encoding qualities. However, fQ features still provide
useful information in combination with fC, as shown by the
results improvement associated with f.
Figure 9 shows the ROC curves obtained for spatial splicing
localization averaged over multiple frames, with the three dif-
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Table 3: Forgery localization examples
Original frame Forged frame Detection
Example frames from a sample of video sequences in the RE-
Verse engineering of audio-VIsual coNtent Data (REWIND)
dataset [24].
ferent features. As expected, we observe a clear improvement
in all descriptors with respect to the single-frame case. Since in
Dspat the forged region is fixed in time, we were able to average
descriptors throughout all the 200 frames of the video sequences.
In a real-case scenario, the assumption of a non-moving forged
region does not hold, in general. However, it is still possible
to resort to this performance-enhancing strategy by averaging
descriptors over short-time windows, assuming that the motion
of the altered region is slow enough, compared to the frame-rate.
All three experiments show that concatenating feature descrip-
tors associated to different classification tasks lead to a clear
performance improvement. As long as we are able to identify
additional classes of forensic traces, we can assume that the
proposed framework would keep taking advantage from a higher
number of trained models.
6.5. Experiments on uncontrolled videos
As a last experiment, we run FOCAL on videos from the
online dataset of the REWIND project [24]. These sequences
contain photo-realistic forgeries, similar to those encountered
in a practical forensic scenario. Original videos were recorded
using low-end devices, with a resolution of 320× 240 pixels and
a framerate of 30 fps. Each forged sequence is available in four
encoding configurations: lossless H.264 and lossy H.264 with
q = 10, 20, 30.
Given the availability of multiple coding qualities for the same
forged video, we used this dataset to assess how the robustness
of the algorithm is impaired as the encoding quality decreases.
Table 2 shows the activation maps calculated by FOCAL on
three frames of sequence 01 of the REWIND dataset. Each map
was obtained from a single frame, with no temporal averaging.
In this example, the forgery consists in a spatial splicing at the
bottom-left corner of the frame: the bigger duck is spliced-out
by copy-moving an empty portion of the water surface and a
second duck is spliced-in. The resulting frame still appears
photo-realistic and spotting the forgery turns out being a chal-
lenging task even for a human observer. As we can see, the
localization capabilities of the algorithm remain satisfying up to
a quality parameter q = 10. Lower encoding qualities progres-
sively erase any useful forensic trace, impairing the detection
reliability. However, since the content itself of the video become
progressively less discernible, it is arguable whether a forger
should ever adopt such low encoding qualities with the purpose
of creating a convincing fake.
Finally, Table 3 reports a series of example frames from dif-
ferent videos of the REWIND dataset.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we presented FOCAL, a framework for video
forgery localization based on the self-consistency of coding
traces. The main contributions that come along with this strat-
egy consist of the design of an ad-hoc CNN architecture for
learning codec-related features and a fusion technique (using the
proposed variance-to-entropy ratio metric) that merges different
features into a general likelihood map, making the framework
scalable and generalizable at will. A first implementation, featur-
ing two independently-trained coding-related descriptors, was
here proposed and tested over two different forgeries situations.
Experimental results showed a clear performance improvement
with respect to the previous work on temporal splicing local-
ization, and promising results in the newly tackled scenario of
spatial splicing localization.
Being able to capture local coding traces over small patches
of a video-frame, paves the way to several possibilities in the
context of forgery detection. Future research will be devoted
to assessing the scalability of the proposed framework through
the addition of further models and by upgrading the existing
ones with a higher number of coding parameters. New strategies
to fuse and leverage feature information could be explored as
well, with the purpose of enabling the detection of increasingly
complex types of forgeries.
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